

Democracy and India

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Liberty, equality, and fraternity are the essence of democracy. But they are in part mutually contradictory. Liberty may obliterate equality and rebuff fraternity; equality may result in loss of liberty and render fraternity unwelcome. Fraternity may impinge on both liberty and equality. Hence an optimal trade-off is necessary.

India is a country of long survivals where people of the nuclear age rub elbows with those of the Neolithic. Once the vast social and economic distance among the people is removed, an immense source of vitality would emerge.

Democracy does not stand alone. Society and economy are the driving forces of history, of which polity is an outcome. Democracy in India has to be accompanied by social reform, economic advancement, as well as inculcation of the universal civilization.

‘But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions,’ — Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

THE banner of the French Revolution had scripted three pillars of democracy, namely, liberty, equality, and fraternity. This triad in turn would set the performance standard for democracy. But, it so happens that they are, to an extent, mutually inconsistent, if not conflicting. Hence there is a scope for trade-off among them. And an optimal combination of them may be derived in the context of a given country. Or, at the least, better it is if they are arranged in a scale of priority.

Now, upon what foundation do these pillars stand? The extant theory of democracy, formulated by Immanuel Kant during the closing years of the eighteenth century, was built upon the singular axiom that all human beings possess the faculty of reason, uniform for all. And this faculty by itself emits rationality, autonomy, freedom, dignity, equality, all; thereby reason becomes the sole author of democracy. That is to say, reason is the foundation of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Clearly, this deduction glosses over man's another compelling faculty, i.e. passion. Kant's contemporary, David Hume thought, ironically, that ‘reason is a servant of passion’. If the kernel of Hume's insight is acceptable, the Kantian theory gets reduced to the

fantasy of ‘a servant’; and the triad lose their base. To be meaningful, therefore, democracy needs a foundation that builds on man's power of reasoning as well as his prowess of working, prompted as it is by passion. Reason and passion both deserve our attention: Aristotle and Marx complement one another.

India is a young democracy, somewhat different in form from the European model. It is a country of long survivals where people of the nuclear age rub elbows with those of the Neolithic. While its universal aspects are to be duly acknowledged, the particulars too must be remembered. This essay begins with an exegesis on links between liberty, equality, and fraternity. It proceeds to discover the basis that would support the democratic trio. In that light, it explores the pattern of democracy in India.

LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

Liberty is a celebration of the individual, and of his individuality. Liberty is the freedom to do or be what a person is able to do or be, subject to certain constraint. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, without causing harm to anyone. Three spheres

of liberty have been identified in the literature: the freedom of thought including its expression through the medium of speech or writing; the freedom to materialize the plan of our life; and the freedom of association. Another way of saying it is this: To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual who is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests the society.

This conception of liberty is cumbersome to say the least. What a person can do or be is contingent on his social or economic position, which varies across individuals. Exercise of liberty by the strong can well obliterate that of the weak. Moreover, drawing the line of demarcation between one's private and public spheres of life is not simple, if not impossible. We in society are so interrelated that whatever one does may possibly affect others, favourable to some and adverse to someone else. That makes the notion of liberty elusive.

But why is liberty generally valued so much? Because without liberty, it is thought, civilization cannot advance; the truth will not come forth; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental energy, for moral courage. Individual has an innate urge to realize his potentialities to full bloom, which benefits not only him but also the civilization at large. Self-realization is the first step towards collective progress. Otherwise society will be crushed by the weight of pervasive mediocrity. Whatever is rich and diversified will be swamped by custom, by men's constant tendency to comply, which breeds only 'withered capacities', 'pinched and hidebound', 'cramped and warped' human beings. Furthermore, no one knows the whole truth; only unhindered discussion and debate among people of diverse opinions can unveil a greater degree of truth, if at all.

But all do not rate liberty so high. A nineteenth-century Russian radical writer declared: boots are superior to the works of Shakespeare; individual freedom is not everyone's primary need. 'Freedom for an Oxford don,' others have added, 'is a very different thing from freedom for an Egyptian peasant.' The Egyptian peasant requires clothes or medicine before, and more than, personal liberty. However, the minimum freedom that he needs today,

and the greater degree of freedom that he may need tomorrow, is not some species of freedom peculiar to him, but identical with that of professors, artists, or millionaires. Again, liberty is not the only goal of men. As the Russian critic Belinsky said: if others are to be deprived of it — if my brothers are to remain in poverty, squalor, and chains — then I do not want it for myself. I reject it with both hands and infinitely prefer to share their fate. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom; I may do so willingly and freely. I am giving up liberty for the sake of justice or equity or the love of my fellow men. Finally, in the past, political regimes showing scant respect to liberty, had nevertheless recorded the rise of genius, progress of civilization, and all the rest; liberty had been neither necessary nor sufficient for social development. Nor is democracy any guarantee for liberty.¹

There is no organic link between individual liberty and democratic rule. Liberty is not the exclusive feature of democracy; equality is. Liberty has appeared in the world at different times in various forms; it is easily lost unless upheld firmly with steady vigilance. It offers exalted privilege to a selected few. Equality, by contrast, is meant for all; once established it lasts longer than liberty, for extinguishing equality involves a long process of changing opinions, laws, habits, manners. We live in the age of democracy, whether liberty or not.

In the event, equality of conditions comes through protracted conflict between different classes of the previous society, pride and exaggerated self-confidence seize upon people's mind. Everyone now pursues his own path; he begins to inquire into everything for himself which is an endless task. Sooner or later he turns to draw upon the judgment of the public, to which he would have unbounded confidence because of the resemblance of them all, and the belief that the greater truth should go with the greater numbers. This trend results in the tyranny of the majority.

The principle of equality has two tendencies: the one leads the mind of everybody to untried thoughts; and the other prohibits it from thinking at all. In the first case, soon he would lose the liberty of mind

as he feels the heavy burden of millions of men breathing down his neck. In the second, his mind would be closely fettered to the perceived general will of the absolute majority. In a country the government is virtually the greatest employer, biggest industrialist, largest landowner, kindest capitalist. Especially, in a country with weak economy, having political power could be a lucrative instrument for manifold achievement. Politics, therefore, draws ample leaders to forge parties, innumerable candidates to contest in election, countless cadres to join the ranks of political foot-soldiers; thus a mammoth political industry is born. Every party conducts its own particular agenda, often regardless of the nation's consideration. The individual is reduced to a cog in the mighty wheel of political machinery; and the tyranny of parties comes to descend upon the people. In effect, equality and liberty become contrary to each other, except at the extreme point of complete universal equality.²

FRATERNITY AND LIBERTY

'Love thy neighbour' is a familiar precept of ethics; love within the neighbourhood is not uncommon. But not so easy as it sounds; we are not sure how to go about it. Who are the ones whom to love, and who are the others not to be so treated? What is to do for them? In the wake of the French Revolution, fraternity was attached alongside with liberty and equality as the third creed of democracy; disparate, it has an ambiguous existence in that milieu, ethics being mixed up with politics. To the extent fraternity may be understood as 'benevolence', it was part of a system of moral sentiments constituting a form of virtue, a notion of great antiquity, going as far back as the teachings of Plato and Pythagoras. Morality and politics do not always mix well.

Happiness is a putative objective of all human beings. Benevolence to a person means contribution to his happiness, by enhancing his pleasure or alleviating his pain. For which we need to know his interests, plans, preferences, and sensibilities; in the absence of authentic information on such intimately personal matters we cannot be truly benevolent to him. What we think as good for him might not be so to him, nor will it be consistent with his liberty

to impose our judgment on him, he being the sovereign of all matters related chiefly to him. That is to say, fraternity might clash with individual's liberty.

We have seen above that liberty may be incompatible with equality; now we realize that liberty and fraternity too could be mutually antagonistic. Hence, by the rule of transitivity, equality and fraternity may impinge on one another. Also, directly, fraternity among the strong is not likely to be conducive to equality of all. A democratic country, therefore, has to determine a feasible combination of liberty, equality, and fraternity. For the very existence of a society, fraternity is indispensable. And equality is the hallmark of democracy. The country, therefore, has to adjust the domain and degree of liberty in accordance with the given context. In other words, the triad of liberty, equality, and fraternity being interrelated, and universal equality and fraternity being essential for democracy, the remaining variable, i.e. liberty, is the one which has to adapt itself to the given environment. Disproportionate liberty would strain the stability of society.³

SOCIAL COHESION

Jawaharlal Nehru in his book, *Discovery of India*, uses the term 'synthesis' to convey what is meant by assimilation of races or tribes into one people with a common denomination of cooperative sentiments. Social synthesis is synonymous with cohesiveness, fellow feeling, group feeling, group consciousness, solidarity, assimilation, or fraternity. He identifies two episodes of synthesis: one between the Aryans and the indigenous tribes of India, and the other between Hindus and Muslims. The country is now, in our perception, going through a third synthesis.

Fusion of tribes has been a common experience of all countries, but their methods differ. Among all comparable countries, China is the closest to India, an old civilization of a large population in a semi-continent size of territory. They are common in many respects, while their modes of social integration are not similar. A brief sketch of China may be in order as a frame of reference. China had

met repeated invasions from the nomads of Inner Asia. During the last thousand years greater parts of China have been ruled more than half the time by alien invaders. Its history is an eloquent anthology of remarkable social and political synthesis.

In the early third century BC, precisely one century after Chandragupta Maurya had ascended the throne in India, the first Imperial dynasty unified China and created a monarchy-bureaucratic system which would endure and hold the country together for two thousand years. The first emperor declared Confucianism as the state religion. Four factors seem to have contributed most to China's integration of diverse tribes into one civilization. One: despite numerous spoken dialects, the *written language* for the greater part of China was uniform. Two: the *public examination* to recruit imperial officials was an open door for all, leading to the highest echelon of aristocracy. Three: the imperial and popular ethos, *Confucianism* taught that though all men possess the same human nature, they are not yet all equal. But when men, any men, acquire virtue through classical scholarship, they also gain authority, the basis of political rule — no discrimination there. Four, and above all: the concept of the *Mandate of Heaven* began way back during the reign of the Zhou Dynasty (1000-771 BC) that introduced an ethical idea into China's society. The term 'Heaven' in China's cosmology represents Nature itself, not a transcendental entity like God. Heaven's mandate to rule over the people might be conferred on any family that was morally worthy of the responsibility. The emphasis on moral behaviour and right conduct led to an idea of 'government by the goodness'. The important concept of the Mandate of Heaven was at once a source of ethical sanction for benevolent and effective government, and a source of legitimacy for rebellion against bad government. This subtle combination of stability and the right to rebel was China's strength and was indeed a great political invention.

Ancient China had two distinct regions: arid steppe in the North and fertile plain in the South, demarcated by the Yellow River, whose basin was the cradle of Chinese civilization. Internal integration of various cultural traits inaugurated the classical

era of Chinese philosophy, to be enriched in due course with influences from abroad. Confucius — virtual contemporary of Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle — had laid the foundation. Chinese thought is *humanistic*. Confucian ethics is about the improvement and humanization of human relationship. Its categorical imperative is this: *The only purpose man can have and also the only worthwhile thing a man can do is to become as good a man as possible*. It has to be pursued for its own sake and with complete indifference to success or failure. On the question of rebirth, Confucianism is agnostic; it does not assure a reward in this life or in the next, if any.

A major Confucian principle is that man is perfectible. By nature, he is good, and has an innate moral sense. He can be led in the right path through education, especially through his own efforts at self-cultivation, and also through emulation of examples set by sages. Confucianism places filial piety high among human virtues. 'Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire', is a salient part of the code of conduct.

Early Chinese cosmology (theory of the universe as an ordered whole) differs from the Western thought. It had no 'Creation' myth and no creator-lawgiver outside of this world, no 'first cause', not even a Big Bang. The early Chinese assumed 'a philosophy of organism, an ordered harmony of wills without an ordainer', 'a fatherless world'. Though generally regarded Heaven as the supreme cosmic power, they saw it as immanent in nature, not as transcendent.

As a school of philosophy, Taoism came much later than the time of Confucius, and had nothing to do with the sagacious old man Lao Tan whom Confucius had met. This school of philosophy, while trying to reveal the underlying laws of nature, stands for conformity with nature and its laws; hence the doctrine of *Wu-Wei* or inaction. Taoism is an empirical philosophy seeking the truth from natural phenomena and human experience. It flourished more among the common people, while standing most opposite to the elitist stance of Confucianism. Tao literally means the *path*, the *way*. It expressed common people's naturalistic cosmology and belief in the

unseen spirits of nature. Taoism was an enormous reservoir of popular lore. It also provided escape from Confucianism, profiting from revulsion of scholars against the ritualism of the classics. It was a refuge from the world of affairs.

Confucianism and Taoism rivalled one another, but also complemented each other. They exercised a balance of power and interaction between them provided momentum to Chinese thought. A common example of balancing act is as follows. *The Chinese scholar was a Confucian when in office and a Taoist when out of office.*

In the fourth century, nomadic hordes came down Southward from the plateaus in the North to set up many petty kingdoms in the plain. A great exodus of Chinese people, among whom were members of literati, was inevitable. They crossed the Yangtze River and settled temporarily in the South-East. Confucianism suffered a setback. Under the circumstances the literati could no longer bear with the Confucian classical restraint; they turned to Taoism and Buddhism for solace, an escape to mystic ecstasy and an asylum in resignation. By the twelfth century, the three trends — Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism — coalesced into one, in the form of Neo-Confucianism. A principle of Neo-Confucianism, for example, reads as follows: 'human mind is a manifestation of the Universal Mind, which is the legislator of the laws of nature.' The modern Chinese family had accepted Neo-Confucianism. Its magnanimous attitude to faith and philosophy could be glimpsed from this: *The father may be a Buddhist, the mother may be a Taoist, the son may be a Christian; and nobody worries about them.*

By contrast with China, clearly India is too much hide-bound with theology, engaged seriously with the afterlife. The metaphysics of its theology is a separatist in the sense that it takes away the individual from the midst of universal humanity to make him stand alone, thereby dipping him in an abyss of loneliness and anxiety with helpless resignation to the unknown and unknowable fate. He loses himself before he comes to realize what he is or could be. Liberty or fraternity resonates little to such an entity.

India's society is so fragmented, wilfully constructed as it was with division and subdivision of the people into imaginary but antagonistic categories, enforced with religious rigour nonetheless. The first two episodes of synthesis, critiqued by Nehru, have left behind a fractured society. Democracy is its own biggest threat. Elections do not guarantee that the elected representatives will be inclined towards democracy. It is conceivable that those who gain control of the legislative process will pass laws which in effect devour the core of democracy. A fractured society like India's is prone to such a denouement.

Eon ago, Chinese pilgrims had come to India for the message of nirvana; they went back home and blended Buddhism with Confucianism. It is time for India to return the compliment — to grasp the value of humanism, to respect human dignity. 'Know your fellow men; ... love your fellow men' — this is the cardinal principle of Confucius, announced over two thousand years ago.⁴ We have to obey this precept and 'become as good a man as possible.' In a family, the father, the mother, and the son may be respectively Hindu, Muslim, and Christian; and nobody should worry about them.

ECONOMIC FREEDOM

An overwhelming majority in India depends directly upon agriculture for their livelihood. Most of them are poor and exploited at multiple levels. Economic freedom of India is contingent upon the emancipation of its peasantry from manifold bondage. When would a peasant be considered free? What constitutes his freedom? The peasant is free (a) if no outside interest — seigneurial, urban or capitalist — comes between him and his land; (b) if he is subject to no bond-service; and finally, (c) if his work is productive enough to feed him and leave a surplus adequate to buy, at the very least what he needs.⁵ In India, the third component, viz. (c), cited above, remains unsatisfied; so the peasant is not free. There is no other way to make the peasantry free but bringing a substantial number of them outside, away from the tiny patch of farmland, into some sufficiently productive activity consistent with a decent standard of living. For true freedom of the

peasantry of India, yet another condition has to be satisfied, namely, no social bondage such as caste code would force a peasant to stick with his ancestral profession.

For their freedom, some of the peasantry have to move to industry, which in turn would claim for its site a small fraction of the country's farmland. This minimal land transfer to industry would not affect our food security. India's farmland is being underutilized in that the possibility of higher productivity through appropriate water management and cultivation has been acknowledged; indeed, a second green revolution is in the offing. Farmers, evidently, had been reluctant to part with their land; their apprehension is understandable. A peasant family receives, not one, but as many as four kinds of benefits from its strip of land, viz. (a) employment of the family members; (b) income from the crops, over and above the wages, by way of rent and profit; (c) guarantee of family security; and (d) social esteem shown to a landowner, however miniscule, as opposed to the derision inflicted upon a landless. Market price of a plot of land cannot reflect the full range of these four facilities that accrue to the peasant owner.

Industry and government ought not simply to compensate the farmer for the loss of land as such. The issue is not merely one of making a farmer a better farmer, but to make him a full human being with all his entitlement to be part of the universal civilization. He is a descendent of those tribesmen whom Chandragupta Maurya herded into labour camps of village settlements, in 321 BC, and the Gupta emperor bound them in social chains, five centuries later. After centuries of deprivation, today he amply deserves to be free. Society should now take life-long responsibility for the material needs of present members of the entire family so that the child of a peasant no longer remains a bonded labour for pushing plough. Industry too would gain by the enhanced supply of trained manpower.⁶

DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

There is certain eerie commonality between political parties and religious sects. All religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they

have drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous proselytes. Austere systems of morality have been adopted by the sects almost constantly. For the notion of austerity bears some flavour of religiosity. Many of them have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining the austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them more than any thing else to the respect and veneration of the common people. Likewise, political parties begin with elaborate promises for especially the poor and downtrodden. Religious sects have got their worldviews predetermined and unshakable. So do political parties; their ideologies of society, economy and polity are burnt on solid steel. Put another way using an analogy with computer,⁷ their axiomatic doctrines constitute the hardware of their thinking process, the corresponding software being periodically adapted to the exigency.

'The *general will* [of the people] is always right and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberation of the people are always equally correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad. ... When factions arise, and partial associations [e.g. political parties] are formed at the expense of the great association [people], the will of each of these associations becomes ... *partial* in relation to the State' (italics added).⁸ There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will. The general will considers only the *common interests*; while the will of all takes private interests into account, and is no more than a sum of the partial wills. Take away from the sum of partial wills the plusses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences. This perception has the following corollary.

People, as free individuals irrespective of party affiliation, have to continue direct discourse among themselves in a general assembly in every village and town to distil the general will from the sum of partial wills cancelling out the contrary elements.

They come to the assembly with open mind, rising above and beyond party politics. The practice of democracy must be democratic. During the prime formative stage of one's personhood, i.e. up to the age of twenty, students should be acquainted with the universal civilization of humankind, unencumbered by any particular ideology of doctrine, philosophy, faith, or attitude. They would then have a mind of freedom, competent to make reasoned judgment and choice. Only then they could be prepared as citizens of democracy.

Men are not born equal, but they can become perfect through education and self-cultivation, says Confucius; so they all are potentially equal. In modern politics, men are considered equal in the limited sense that they are not discriminated in the eyes of law. Kant deduces the equality of men from their possession of the faculty of reason. With such arguments it appears that the concept of equality has not yet been firmly established. We propose that the dignity of man can be demonstrated by reference to his innate worth; and that would lead us to the equality of men.

We have here three proofs in favour of universal human dignity, based on three empirical observations, namely, the Aristotelian principle, the Ricardian comparative advantage, and Schrodinger's formulation of the evolution by natural selection. First, no one can do everything he might do, nor can he do everything that any other person can do. The potentialities of each individual are greater than those he can hope to realize. Everyone selects which of his propensities he wishes to encourage. Society is founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members so that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. The members enjoy one another's excellences and individuality. This shows their social worth.

Human behaviour has two peculiarities. We take greater interest and receive greater enjoyment, in doing something as we become more proficient at it. Moreover, of two activities in which we are equally competent, other things remaining equal, we prefer the one which is of greater complexity. For instance, algebra is more intricate than elementary arithmetic; so a person would rather study algebra

than elementary arithmetic. The factors contributing to such behaviour are as follows. Complex activities give him more pleasure as they satisfy his desire for variety and novelty of experience; they allow room for the exercise of ingenuity and creativity. Efforts to solve a critical problem offer the pleasure of anticipation and surprise. This theory of human motivation is called the Aristotelian Principle.

The principle produces a dynamic equilibrium. At a given period, as a person acquires more capacities, he prefers more complex activities, so that he could utilize his newly realized abilities. And he receives greater satisfaction. The incremental, i.e. marginal, benefit of activities goes up with his increasing repertoire of skill. It has another side, the costs. With rising complexity of activities, learning the required skills tends to be more strenuous and expensive. That is to say, the marginal cost of acquiring skill rises. There is, as it were, a race between the two: marginal benefit and marginal cost. An equilibrium situation is reached where the two forces balance one another: marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal. At this point effort to achieve greater realized capacities ceases, for the given period.

Since the person has added to his store of skill in the given period, the next period would begin with a larger repertoire of his abilities. As a result, the marginal benefit across the board would be higher in the next period compared to that in the given period. The equilibrium point in the next period, therefore, would be at a higher level of complex activities, assuming for simplicity that cost conditions remain as they were before. This is the dynamics of the Aristotelian Principle.

Second, every human being in the economy can make a contribution; that is to say, he has an economic worth. He has *comparative advantage* in certain economic activity, claims David Ricardo. 'Comparative advantage' is distinct from 'absolute advantage'. Consider two persons, *A* and *B*. Person *A* is a lawyer; person *B* is a typist. Suppose *A* is proficient in law as well as in typing, so much so that he excels *B* even in the competence of typing. In that case, *A* is said to have *absolute* advantage in both professions vis-à-vis *B*. Person *B* has no

knowledge of practicing law in court, so he does not have absolute advantage in any of the two areas. Nevertheless, *B* has comparative advantage, relative to *A*, in typing, in the sense that he is less 'worse' in typing than in law. By similar logic *A* has comparative advantage in the practice of law. It would be economically profitable for both if *A* specializes in the job of practicing law, and *B* in typing. The central idea is that everyone in general has comparative advantage in one or the other field of economic activity. Such competence of the individual is another ground of his dignity.

Third, theory and practice show that we are capable of modulating, up to a point, the course of our own genetic evolution. Behaviour of the individuals of a species, according to Edwin Schrodinger, exerts significant influence on the direction of evolution. A change in diet, for example, can affect the genes, within a rather short period. Indeed, our genetic evolution will depend on us and our doing. Human beings are not merely repositories of achievement in the past; they are also creators of their own future, up to a point. Their mastery over nature ipso facto is a testimony of their humane worth.⁹

Since all human beings have threefold worth, they are all equal in society. The triad of democracy, namely, liberty, equality, and fraternity, stand on the premise of universal human dignity.

CONCLUDING REMARK

Society and economy are the driving forces of history, of which polity is an outcome. In the absence of socio-economic freedom and equality, political democracy has little valence. The most compelling challenge before India is to uplift the seven-tenths of the population, who are deemed 'backward' of varying degrees, from poverty and social deprivation. Inculcation of the spirit of universal civilization has to accompany social reform and economic development.

Democracy is vulnerable to misuse and misrepresentation. Civil society is concerned typically

with the state vis-à-vis individuals, not so much with social affairs. Direct movement of all people together, irrespective of political affiliation, has to supplement the efforts of parliamentary democracy.

NOTES

1. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*; Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*.
2. Alex de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*; Ranjit Sau, *The Foundation of Democracy in India* (forthcoming).
3. This proposition may be formalized thus. Let x , y , and z represent respectively liberty, equality, and fraternity; and f an implicit function showing the relationship among the variables as follows: $f(x, y, z) = 0$. Since equality and fraternity are considered indispensable for democracy, their values are given; that is, y and z are known. Then the value of x is solved from the above equation. In other words, the quantum of liberty is determined by the context.
4. Confucius, *The Analects*, xii:22.
5. Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, at 316.
6. Ranjit Sau, 'Second Industrial Revolution in India: Land and the State,' *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(7) 17 February 2007.
7. Thought or thinking is a function of mind. Brain provides the mind with certain organizing principles and parameters: both are genetic endowments. We know that computers are structured in the image of human mind. For the moment, let us view also the process of thinking in analogy with a computer. Let us imagine that thinking is done by means of an assembled 'hardware' and 'software', as it is in the case of a computer. Hardware of the thinking-process-computer (thinking-hardware, in short) is constituted mostly during childhood and adolescence within the environment of family, school and college. The term thinking-hardware does not refer to any physical part of the brain like tissues or nerves; this hardware is ethereal, impalpable, consisting of a store of certain information as elaborated below. Since 18 is the minimum age for the right to vote or to join army in many countries one might say that by that time the making of thinking-hardware is completed, pending periodic updating. And software is installed in the thinking-computer throughout one's life, e.g. by learning algebra or climbing mountain. The thinking-hardware is made of two kinds of ingredients, namely, (i) on the one hand, a set of discrete, *a priori* concepts such as time, space, quantity, quality, and reality, and (ii) on the other, certain statements relating to, for example, the emergence of the universe, the purpose of human life, and the nature of time. Ranjit Sau, 'Towards Transition to Democracy', *Bharatiya Samajik Chintan*, 7(1) April-June 2008, at 31.
8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, chapter 3.
9. Sau, 'Towards Transition to Democracy', at 30.